Day 7 of the U.S.–Israel War: The Strategy Appears to Be Working, and Iran Is Losing

“War is the continuation of politics by other means.” – Carl von Clausewitz

Seven days into the U.S.–Israel war with Iran, the central question is not simply what has happened on the battlefield, but whether the strategy behind the war is working.

In classical strategic terms, war must always be evaluated through the relationship between political objectives and military action. The Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz argued that the political objective determines the military means used to achieve it. The success of a war cannot be measured simply by explosions, missile launches, or headlines. It must be measured by whether the use of force achieves the political objectives of the war, whether through territorial control, destruction of military capability, or compelling the enemy to change its behavior in accordance with those objectives.

The first task, therefore, is to identify what those objectives actually are.

Thus far, the United States has been consistent in publicly stating its goals. President Donald Trump’s March 1 statement announcing the start of operations made clear that the war is aimed at ending the Iranian regime’s nuclear weapons pursuit, destroying the missile capabilities that Tehran has long used as a shield for that nuclear ambition, and eliminating Iran’s ability to threaten global commerce through the Strait of Hormuz.

Senior officials have repeated this framework in multiple public briefings, including remarks by President Trump on March 1, Secretary of State Marco Rubio on March 2, and joint press conferences by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine on March 2 and March 4.

Across these statements, the political objective has remained consistent.

This is not a declared regime change war.

That distinction matters. Strategic objectives must be judged based on what political leaders state as their aims, not what critics speculate those aims might secretly become. The stated goal of this war is not to overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran. The stated goal is to compel the regime to fundamentally change its behavior: abandon its nuclear weapons ambitions, degrade its ballistic missile capabilities, stop threatening the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and cease its decades-long use of proxy terrorism across the Middle East.

If the regime ultimately collapses under the pressure of military defeat or internal revolt, that would certainly be a positive outcome of the war. But it has not, at least publicly, been declared as its strategic objective.

This distinction is not academic.

I understand the skepticism surrounding wars in the Middle East. I participated in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which was explicitly framed as a regime change war. The stated objective was the removal of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party from power, along with the elimination of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs.

Like many soldiers preparing for that operation, my unit was told by our two-star commander that the campaign would likely be a sixty-day operation.

But to be very clear and frank: Iran is not Iraq.

The Saddam regime was removed from power quickly, but the United States then disbanded the Iraqi army and large parts of the Ba’ath government structure. What followed was a prolonged effort to impose a new political system and conduct nation-building while fighting a growing insurgency. Nation-building and counterinsurgency became the dominant mission, far beyond the initial objectives of the invasion.

History unfolded very differently than originally planned.

But strategic analysis must evaluate the war that exists, not the war people fear might emerge. Until the United States alters its stated political objectives, the strategy must be measured against the goals that have actually been articulated.

In Clausewitzian terms, the question becomes simple: Is force being used effectively to compel Iran to do our will?

Seven days into the war, the evidence increasingly suggests that it is.

The United States and Israel are imposing their will on the Islamic regime in Iran.

To understand why this matters, we must also understand Iran’s strategy.

Clausewitz described war as “nothing but a duel on a larger scale.” He wrote that the struggle resembles two wrestlers locked together, each trying to throw the other to the ground in order to render him incapable of resistance.

For decades, Iran pursued a grand strategy built on terrorism, proxy warfare, and regional chaos. The regime invested billions in militant groups, missile forces, and destabilizing campaigns across the Middle East. From Lebanon to Iraq to Yemen, Tehran cultivated armed proxies designed to threaten Israel, attack American forces, intimidate neighboring states, and destabilize the region.

Chaos was not a side effect of Iran’s strategy. It was the strategy.

But when this war began on March 1, Iran entered the conflict with a more immediate wartime strategy.

Iran sought to spread enough devastation across the region to fracture the coalition forming against it. Missile and drone attacks were launched not only against Israel but across the broader region in an attempt to threaten multiple states simultaneously and create fear throughout the Middle East.

The goal was to destabilize neighboring countries, intimidate American partners, and disrupt global energy markets by threatening shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and through attacks across the region.

At the same time, Iran hoped to force the United States into a strategic dilemma. If the regime could absorb the initial blows and continue launching attacks across the region, Washington would face two unattractive choices: allow the regime to survive with its nuclear and missile ambitions intact, or launch a large-scale ground invasion of Iran that would likely be costly, prolonged, and politically divisive.

In other words, Iran hoped to widen the war faster than the United States and Israel could control it. So far, that strategy appears to be failing.

This war now presents the possibility of reversing Iran’s regional model.

Instead of a Middle East shaped by terrorism and proxy conflict, the outcome of this war could move the region toward something very different: a Middle East of partnered countries committed to peace, coexistence, security cooperation, and economic prosperity.

But achieving that outcome requires breaking the tools Iran built to sustain its strategy.

That process is now underway.

Since the beginning of the conflict, U.S. forces have struck more than 2,000 targets across Iran and Iranian-controlled military infrastructure in the region. Roughly half of those strikes occurred within the first 24 hours. U.S. Central Command described the opening attacks as nearly double the scale of the first day of the 2003 “shock and awe” campaign during the invasion of Iraq.

The effects have been significant.

Iran’s leadership structure now appears to be in profound disarray both politically and militarily. Confirmed strikes have killed Iran’s Supreme Leader, the Minister of Defense, and the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, along with dozens of other senior political, military, and security officials. The sudden removal of so many figures at the top of the regime has created immediate uncertainty about succession, command authority, and the regime’s ability to coordinate a coherent response.

Leadership decapitation is not by itself a guaranteed method of changing regime behavior. History shows that regimes can sometimes absorb the loss of senior leaders and continue their policies. But the simultaneous elimination of multiple senior leaders in a short period of time disrupts decision-making, weakens internal confidence, and forces remaining officials to focus on survival as much as strategy.

The continued threat that newly appointed successors could also be targeted only compounds that instability.

Iran’s military capabilities are also being steadily degraded.

Iranian missile launch activity has dropped by roughly 90 percent since the opening phase of the war, while drone launch activity has declined by more than 80 percent, according to operational assessments from U.S. and Israeli military officials. Launch sites, storage facilities, and production infrastructure have been systematically targeted in sustained strike operations.

Iranian naval forces have also suffered substantial losses. At least 30 Iranian naval vessels have been destroyed, including fast attack craft and drone launch platforms used by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy to threaten shipping and regional naval forces in the Persian Gulf. The result is a steady erosion of Iran’s ability to project power and disrupt maritime traffic beyond its shores.

Iran built missiles, drones, naval harassment capabilities, and proxy networks to deter war and raise the costs of confronting it. It wanted deterrence. It is getting disarmament.

Iran’s missile arsenal has long been one of its primary instruments of coercion. Iran possesses the largest ballistic missile force in the Middle East, with systems capable of striking targets across the entire region and into parts of Europe, Africa, and Asia. From launch sites inside Iran, these missiles can threaten U.S. forces, regional partners, and major population centers across a vast geographic area.

Tehran openly discussed expanding that missile force dramatically as the foundation of a broader strategy built on nuclear capability and regional dominance.

Degrading that arsenal therefore has implications far beyond the current conflict.

At the same time, the campaign includes a component that is less visible but equally important: strategic messaging.

President Trump and the U.S. administration appear to have deliberately introduced elements of unpredictability and uncertainty into the conflict. That approach reflects another Clausewitzian principle.

“War is the realm of uncertainty,” he wrote, noting that three quarters of the factors on which action is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty.

Uncertainty is not merely a condition of war. It can also be a weapon.

By keeping the scope and duration of operations unclear, the United States forces Iranian leaders to consider a wide range of possible escalatory outcomes. Will the campaign last days or weeks? Will ground forces eventually be introduced? Could Kurdish fighters along Iran’s western frontier become involved? Could Azeri or Balochi unrest intensify? Might internal dissent inside Iran escalate into a broader uprising?

None of these possibilities need to occur in order to create strategic pressure.

Their mere plausibility forces Iranian decision-makers to confront multiple simultaneous dilemmas.

A ground invasion of Iran would be one of the most complex military operations in modern history. Iran is geographically vast, mountainous, and home to nearly ninety million people.

The United States appears to be pursuing a strategy designed to achieve political objectives without committing to that form of war, while ensuring that Iranian leadership cannot assume such an option is impossible.

Seven days into the conflict, the military balance clearly favors the United States and Israel.

Iran’s attacks against Israel and other regional states have been significantly reduced. Its missile and drone forces are being systematically degraded. Its naval capabilities are being destroyed. Its leadership structure is under continuous pressure.

The Islamic regime in Iran is no longer shaping this war. It is reacting to it.

Just as importantly, the United States, our forces, and our interests are already safer today than they were seven days ago. The regime’s ability to secretly pursue a nuclear weapon, threaten American troops in the region, intimidate neighboring states, and hold global commerce hostage through missile and naval coercion is being steadily degraded.

None of this guarantees the final outcome of the war.

No one can say with certainty whether the Iranian regime will abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons, agree to intrusive international inspections, surrender its stockpile of roughly 400 kilograms of sixty percent enriched uranium, dismantle its expanding ballistic missile program, stop using the Strait of Hormuz as a coercive threat against the global economy, or end its decades-long investment in proxy militias and terrorist organizations.

And yes, President Trump’s demand for “unconditional surrender” is consistent with the political objectives stated from the beginning of the war. It does not necessarily mean the surrender of the Iranian state. It means the unconditional end of the behaviors that caused the conflict. The regime must abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons, dismantle its missile program, end its support for terrorism across the region, and stop threatening the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and global commerce. In strategic terms, it is a demand that Iran accept the political outcome this war is designed to achieve.

But what can be evaluated now is the strategy.

The use of force appears to be systematically reducing the regime’s capabilities across multiple domains. Nuclear facilities continue to be targeted. Missile forces are being degraded. Naval assets are being destroyed. Leadership within the regime’s military and security apparatus is being eliminated.

The measure of strategy is not noise, destruction, or headlines. It is whether force is bending the enemy toward your political objective.

Seven days into the war, the evidence suggests that is exactly what is happening. One example is the Iranian president publicly apologizing for attacks on neighboring countries, an early signal that the regime may already be recalculating its behavior, though such statements must ultimately be judged by actions rather than words.

A final caution is necessary.

In the information age, analysis is everywhere. But not all analysis is equal.

Just as a reader should examine the biography of an author before purchasing a serious book, it is wise to examine the background of anyone claiming expertise on this war. Review their professional and academic history. Examine their previous commentary on military operations. Look at their social media posts and past analysis.

If someone has a long record of purely political commentary, whether anti-Trump, anti-American, anti-Israel, or driven by ideological positions, it becomes difficult for that individual to separate political preference from objective strategic analysis.

War demands clear thinking.

The coming days will reveal whether Iran chooses escalation, endurance, or negotiation. For now, the strategic duel continues.

John Spencer is the Executive Director of the Urban Warfare Institute

He is the coauthor of Understanding Urban Warfare.

Learn more at www.johnspenceronline.com

X: @SpencerGuard