The Failed Logic in Dave Smith’s Morality of War

Dave Smith, a libertarian comic, has taken to the world’s biggest podcasts—including a recent debate with me onPiers Morgan Uncensored—to argue that war should be judged by the same moral logic as domestic murder. He claims “war” is just a word politicians use to seize power, not a meaningful shift in moral reality. Given the size of his audience and the intensity of public reaction, it’s worth answering his claims head-on.

On Joe Rogan’s podcast, Smith laid out

what he called a “simple moral argument”:

“Let’s say somebody broke onto your property and killed your family members, and you want to go kill this guy. If he goes back to his apartment building and there’s women and children inside, and your move is to blow up the building—well, what you’d be charged with is murder in the first degree…You dropped a bomb knowing innocent people were going to die. That is by definition intentional.”

The analogy might sound persuasive, especially in the age of gut-wrenching war footage on our smartphones: you did drop a bomb knowing innocents would die, after all. But this is a rhetorical sleight of hand. It confuses a linguistic truth—that harm was foreseeable—with a moral falsehood: that the act is inherently wrong, no matter the context.

Yes, at an obvious level, the actual pressing of the button while knowing innocents were in the vicinity is “intentional.” But as a profound point beyond linguistic tautology, the implied idea—that no matter what the surrounding circumstances, it is always immoral to press that button—is preposterous.

To see how absurd Smith’s logic is, simply flip the numbers: suppose you knew there were 98 ISIS operatives inside a building actively planning attacks, along with two innocent babies. Dropping a bomb on that building would still be intentional—and done with the full knowledge that those babies would die. Even in this reversed scenario, only a moral extremist could fail to see what’s wrong with Smith’s claim.

The central issue is the confusion of two entirely separate systems: civilian criminal law on the one hand, and the conduct of war on the other. These exist for different purposes, under different real-world constraints, and, by practical necessity, are governed by different rules. Not accounting for such different conditions is a kind of moral blindness.

Domestically, we rely on police and courts to uphold moral and legal order. If someone commits murder, the system investigates, arrests, and prosecutes. That model breaks down in war. You can’t arrest an invading army or call 911 when rockets are incoming, as your government no longer holds a monopoly on the use of force. Therefore, what would have been criminal violence is necessary to neutralize the threat. This is why the law of armed conflict (LOAC) exists, often referred to as international humanitarian law (IHL).

Smith seemed to think my referring to laws rather than moral principles was, per se, a way to weasel out of moral thinking, but this is a total inversion. Appealing to the LOAC is not an abandonment of morality but an attempt to preserve it under the worst human conditions, as opposed to pretending away the moral relevance of those conditions. And while it operates through legal language, LOAC is grounded in basic moral truths.

The law of war is not a loophole in morality—it is morality under fire. It rests on three foundational principles: distinction, proportionality, and precaution. You may only target enemy combatants or civilians directly participating in hostilities; civilian harm must not be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage; and every feasible step must be taken to minimize civilian casualties.

These are codified moral imperatives that grew out of centuries of moral and legal reasoning about what exactly a good person or group is to do when confronted by systematic lethal violence emanating from a different society, group, or country. From Thomas Aquinas, who articulated the principles of just cause and right intention, to Hugo Grotius, who laid the legal groundwork for distinguishing combatants from civilians, the greatest minds on war have insisted that armed conflict must be governed by reason and ethics. In war, applied morality legitimizes certain acts of violence that would be criminal in peacetime—but only within the strict bounds of moral and legal constraint. These ideas were in place long before modern international law, but they remain central to it.

Smith ignores all of this. He frames war as an act of personal vengeance: “you wanted to get one guy, so you blew up the building.” But this bears no resemblance to how modern, law-abiding militaries operate—nor to how morality governs war. Liberal democratic forces are bound by rigorous legal and ethical standards: targets must be lawful military objectives; civilian harm must not be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage; and commanders must take all feasible precautions to minimize harm. That includes issuing warnings, using precision munitions, or delaying strikes when civilians are present. From his account of the IDF’s actions—though these standards apply across all liberal democracies—it’s unclear whether Smith knows such assessments are conducted, let alone that entire units are dedicated to them. But they are. I’ve watched these assessments carried out repeatedly throughout this war.

Even the criminal law Smith appeals to recognizes moral nuance. Killing can be murder, manslaughter, or no crime at all—depending on intent and circumstance. Someone acting in self-defense isn’t charged as a murderer, even if others are harmed. The law of war applies the same logic, but under far more extreme and complex conditions.

To be clear, this isn’t personal—I’m addressing the arguments, not the man. But Smith represents a growing genre of pundits with massive platforms who wield moral outrage without understanding what they’re condemning. They conflate war with crime, tactics with atrocities, and lawful military action with terrorism—while offering no serious alternatives. (“Give Hamas a state as a reward for October 7” is not a policy.)

These aren’t just bad arguments. They’re dangerously shallow—and they should be rejected outright.

John Spencer is chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute (MWI) at West Point and host of the "Urban Warfare Project Podcast." He is the co-author of “Understanding Urban Warfare" You can follow him on 'X' at: @SpencerGuard

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